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1. Introduction
In his engaging 1990’s paper “America’s green strategy”, Michael Porter provided case
studies to support the argument that the stricter a country’s environmental policy, the
more its firms innovate in a profitable way to produce less polluting or more resource-
efficient products; see Porter (1996). Porter and van der Linde (1995) present further
firm-level evidence and put forward that the above argument holds true in a world where
firms do not always make optimal choices, due, e.g., to organizational inertia and control
problems. Otherwise, complying with a stricter environmental policy could never be
profitable. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) called that argument the strong Porter hypothesis,
which they distinguished from a weak hypothesis whereby “the additional innovation
[comes] at an opportunity cost that exceeds its benefits” for firms. They also identified a
narrow version, which makes no consideration about profits and favors direct regulation
(e.g., standards and output ceilings) when pollution requires immediate action.
There have been attempts in endogenous growth theory to model the strong Porter
hypothesis as a channel of transmission of stricter environmental policy to growth. A few
of those attempts focus attention on the importance of the assumption of profit maxi-
mization for this hypothesis. Ricci (2007a) recommends researchers “[not to drop] the
assumption of rationality”, that is, the profit maximization model, under informational
constraints on the part of firms’ owners. Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2002), in contrast,
assert that replacing profit maximization with non-optimizing behavior creates possible
improvements in profits. Ambec and Barla (2007) suggest to use the Aghion, Dewatripont
and Rey’s (1997) framework with intermediate firms in which managers’ decisions about
innovation are better considered as satisficing rather than profit-maximizing. As far as
we are aware of this strand of the endogenous growth literature, its authors subscribe to
the former approach. They assume that firms pursue profit maximization in all markets.1
This paper contributes to the debate on the importance of assuming profit maximizing
firms in models of the strong Porter hypothesis. We relax this assumption regarding
the decisions of managers on innovation. We use the R&D-driven endogenous growth
framework of Aghion and Griffith (2005), which we extend to allow for pollution and
environmental taxation. Innovation is undertaken in the intermediate sector. We impose
regulation in the final good sector as in Nakada’s (2004) endogenous growth model.
This assumption is consistent with Porter and van der Linde’s (1995) suggestion that
governments should “regulate as late in the production chain as practical, which will
normally allow more flexibility for innovation there and in the upstream stages.” (p.
111).2 Aghion and Griffith’s (2005) model is a special case of the vintage capital model
of Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1997) in which owners incur a high fixed cost of
production/innovation which they internally finance. In this latter model, which provides
micro foundations for satisficing behavior in endogenous growth theory, managers who
discount future benefits and costs choose a size of innovation just high enough to avoid
bankruptcy and hence preserve their private benefit of control.
Previous endogenous growth models on Porter hypothesis are based on profit maxi-
mizing behavior. They include Nakada (2004) who allows for pollution and a resource
constraint on R&D activities in a framework a` la Aghion and Howitt (1992). He finds
1 The microeconomic literature on Porter hypotheses includes various behavioral models of the firm;
see Ambec, Cohen, Elgie, and Lanoie (2013) for a survey on these models. Other market imperfections
are also covered in Mohr and Saha (2008) and Andre´ (2015).
2 Porter and van der Linde (1995) who have a preference for market-based regulation pose the question
of where to impose environmental regulation in the chain of production.
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that the “general equilibrium effect” of an increase in the environmental tax rate offsets
the “profitability effect” in the intermediate inputs sector. In the long-term, environ-
mental taxation enhances growth and reduces the level of pollution. We calculated the
long-term effect of an increase in the tax rate on downstream firms’ profits in Nakada’s
(2004) model. This effect is positive, thus verifying the strong Porter hypothesis.
Mohr (2002) finds results consistent with the narrow Porter hypothesis in a vintage
capital framework with positive spillovers in production, new technologies which are
more productive and cleaner than the old technologies, and producers who have a cost
to switch to these latter. At any period every firm can behave selfishly by letting the
others bear the switching cost. Under certain conditions, a stricter environmental policy
(a technology standard whereby all firms must switch to the new technology) alleviates
pollution and increases output. There is a risk in Mohr’s (2002) model, however, that a
benevolent planner finds profitable to let pollution be higher as technology improves. In
Hart’s (2004) model, environmental regulation consists in favouring recent vintages too.
His results are consistent with the narrow version of Porter hypothesis.
Ricci (2007b) extends the multi-period frameworks of Hart (2004, 2007) by taking into
account flexibility in the technological choice of R&D firms. He analyzes the possibility
that environmental taxation, instead of standards, crowds out old and dirty intermediates
inputs. Unlike in Hart (2004, 2007), productivity growth is negatively affected in Ricci’s
(2007b) model. Among non-endogenous growth models taking up the strong Porter
hypothesis without departing from the maximization model, there is Xepapadeas and
de Zeeuw (1999) who analyze the effect of environmental policy on capital accumulation.
These authors eventually predict the weak Porter hypothesis: although an emission tax
increases average productivity by stimulating the retirement of older vintage capital, the
profits of taxed firms decrease. Feichtinger, Hartl, Kort, and Veliov (2005), who extend
Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) to allow for nonlinear functional forms and technological
change, do not find the strong Porter hypothesis either in their model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
In section 2 we extend the Aghion and Griffith’s (2005) model to allow for pollution
and environmental taxation. Section 3 focuses on the effects of an increase in the en-
vironmental tax rate (a stricter environmental policy) on innovation, pollution, growth
and downstream profit. This change in environmental policy plays the same role as an
increase in potential competition in Aghion and Griffith’s (2005) model: it makes the
survival constraint of intermediate firms tighter; satisficing managers, who fear to loose
their job, respond by increasing the size of innovation, which, in return, raises the quality
of intermediate inputs and reduces pollution. Furthermore, the higher tax rate increases
economic growth and downstream firm’s profit, thus verifying the strong Porter hypothe-
sis. Section 4 discusses several changes to the model’s assumptions and a few extensions.
For instance, we assume that innovation is drastic, that is, in each intermediate market,
innovation is large enough that the incumbent monopoly can charge a price above the
marginal cost of the fringe. We also replace the market-based policy with a command and
control policy. The main extension adds competition policy. Section 5 concludes with
suggestions about possible extensions regarding the assumption of profit-maximization
in the model.
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2. The model
We use the R&D-driven endogenous growth model of Aghion and Griffith (2005) with
satisficing managers, which we extend to allow for pollution and environmental taxation
of producers in the final good market. In Aghion and Griffith’s (2005) model, the gro-
wth rate of the economy is an increasing function of the satisficing size of innovation,
which itself is determined by intermediate firms exploiting their market power against
final good producers and blocking entry of a less cost-effective fringe. Their two-period
discrete model is a simplified version of the Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1997) analy-
sis of the relationship between competition, industrial policy and growth for two types of
intermediate firms. Firms in which managers’ decisions regarding the size of innovation is
to maximize profits, and firms in which managers maximize their private benefits net of
innovation efforts. We consider only the second type of firms whose managers are called
“satisficing managers” throughout the rest of the text.
2.1 The competitive final good sector. One final nume´raire good yt is produced
competitively in period t according to the constant returns to scale production function
yt =
∫ 1
0
At(i)
1−αxt(i)
αdi, 0 < α < 1, (1)
where the productivity parameter At(i) also measures the quality of the flow of interme-
diate input i, xt(i), at time t.
We follow Nakada (2004) who assumes that pollution arises from the use of the x’s
in production of y. An environmental technology index zt(i) relates the quantities of
intermediate inputs to pollution. Unlike in Nakada (2004), however, zt(i) is endogenous;
it is inversely proportional to At(i), that is, zt(i) ≡ 1/At(i).
3 The structural pollution
equation in each intermediate market i is therefore
zt(i)xt(i) =
xt(i)
At(i)
≡ Pt(i). (2)
Equation (2) is consistent with the argument of Nakada (2004) that the higher the index
(the lower the quality of i), the higher the level of pollution per unit of intermediate
input (Ricci, 2007a, p. 696 defines this ratio as pollution intensity).4 Environmental
policy takes the form of a unique unit tax τt. The tax, which varies directly as Pt(i), is
paid by the downstream firm to discourage pollution.5 This assumption is different, e.g.,
from that of Hart (2004) who applies the unit tax to output. Let the price of the ith
intermediate input be pt(i). The representative downstream firm’s profit πt(y) is:
yt −
∫ 1
0
pt(i)xt(i)di− τt
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)di. (3)
For each intermediate input i, downstream firms maximize (3), given the technology in
(1), up to the point where marginal productivity α(xt(i)/At(i))
α−1 equals tax-inclusive
marginal cost pt(i) + τt(i)/At(i). The solution leads to the following inverse demand,
pt(i) = α(xt(i)/At(i))
α−1 −
τt
At(i)
. (4)
3 In section 4 we consider the less restrictive assumption of imperfect negative correlation between z
and A (zt(i) ≡ 1/At(i)
β).
4 Notice in equation (2) that there are no spillovers between markets.
5 The average tax per unit of input τtPt(i)/xt(i) = τtzt(i) also varies directly as pollution intensity.
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We see that the unit tax on pollution shifts downward the demand schedule for the
intermediate good. We now turn to incumbent firms’ decisions in the intermediate sector.
2.2 The decisions of monopolistically competitive intermediate firms. Incum-
bent firms make two related decisions: the quantity of x to sell to final good producers
(regardless the degree to which this amount will degrade the environment), and their ma-
nagers decide on the size of innovation, which will be defined later. Incumbents produce x
from y according to the identity technology at a marginal cost of 1. In each intermediate
market i, a fringe could produce the same good at a higher marginal cost (of imitation)
χ > 1. Innovation is non-drastic (α−1 > χ).6 Incumbents exert their market power by
charging the limit price pt(i) = χ so as to prevent the fringe from entering their market.
Setting equation (4) equal to χ, the equilibrium sales for intermediate input i is
xt(i) = α
1
1−α (χ+ τt/At(i))
1
α−1 At(i). (5)
Inserting equation (5) in equation (2), pollution is equal to:
Pt(i) = α
1
1−α (χ+ τt/At(i))
1
α−1 , (6)
which decreases with environmental regulation stringency (∂Pt(i)/∂τt < 0), holding At(i)
and all parameters constant.
Intermediate firms are self-financed. In addition to a unit marginal cost they incur a
fixed cost of production κAt−1(i) at the beginning of period t. κ is sufficiently large to
allow for bankruptcy (κ > χ−1), in which case, managers would lose their job. Managers
live for one period. The value for profit net of the fixed cost of production in period t
is πt(i) = (pt(i) − 1)xt(i) − κAt−1(i). Under the previous assumption that intermediate
incumbents opt for limit pricing, and using equation (5), πt(i) can be rewritten as:
πt(i) = (χ− 1)α
1
1−α (χ+ τt/At(i))
1
α−1 At(i)− κAt−1(i). (7)
Let us denote the size of innovation in intermediate market i by γ(i). Each time an
intermediate firm i innovates, its productivity increases by the factor γ(i):
At(i) = γ(i)At−1(i). (8)
Inserting equation (8) in equation (7), one obtains:
πt(i) = [(χ− 1)α
1
1−α
(
χ+
τt
γ(i)At−1(i)
) 1
α−1
γ(i)− κ]At−1(i), ∀ 0 ≤ i ≤ 1. (9)
Unlike the Aghion and Griffith’s (2005, p. 38) model, in which there is no pollution and
no environmental regulation, intermediate profits πt(i) are nonlinear in γ(i) for all i; thus,
finding a solution which corresponds to managers’ decisions on the size of innovation is
different than in their model where the γ(i)’s are equal across intermediate markets.
6 α−1 is the monopoly price incumbent intermediate firms would charge were environmental regulation
absent. Under regulation, the price is equal to α−1 + α−1(1− α)τt/At(i), which is greater than α
−1.
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2.3 Satisficing managers and the size of innovation. Porter and van der Linde
(1995) suggest organizational inertia and lack of control over managers among the possible
constraints that firms will have to shift to comply with environmental policy. Interes-
tingly, Aghion and Griffith (2005) assume intermediate firms subject to organizational
slack in their framework, although they do not formalize slack as explicitly as in Aghion,
Dewatripont, and Rey (1999). Relying on the works of Nohria and Gulati (1996) and Ag-
hion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1997, 1999), we define slack as under-exploited managerial
resources to increase innovation, in the sense that managers enjoy private benefits (net
of innovation efforts) greater than the amount required to retain them within the firm.
This definition of “slack” has a quantitative counterpart. Let us denote the private
benefit a manager gets from controlling the intermediate firm by B. And, let B − γ
denote this benefit net of innovation efforts. The difference B − γ is a simple version of
managers’ objective function in Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1999). However, Aghion
and Griffith (2005) do not not include B in their model; they consider a straightforward
solution for γ that results from setting equation (9) equal to 0.7 Managers, who fear to
loose their job, are mainly concerned with preserving a positive net benefit of control
in intermediate firms; thus, as long as B > γ, there is some room to reduce slack. We
model the decision of satisficing managers on the size of innovation by solving the classical
programming problem maxγ{B − γ : π ≥ 0}. The implicit solution of this problem, γ
ND
(‘ND’ stands for ‘non-drastic’ innovation), is highlighted in Figure 1.
For abscissae we have γ. For ordinates, we have the values of an intermediate firm’s
profit π (equation (9)) and of manager’s benefit net of innovation efforts B − γ which is
represented by the line with slope −1. γND is the point at which the profit function π
(the thick curve) crosses the horizontal axis (see the first part of Proposition 1 in Ap-
pendix A). If managers choose a size γ < γND, then their net benefit of control increases
but the firm goes bankrupt (π < 0). Whereas, if γ > γND, owners’ profit increases
at the expense of managers. The difference B − γND may be defined as a measure of
organizational slack at point γND. If there were no organizational slack and if managers
had an outside option that yields a net benefit of zero, then B would be the maximum
innovation effort and [(χ − 1)α
1
1−α (χ+ τt/BAt−1(i))
1
α−1 B − κ]At−1(i) ≡ π¯(i) would be
the maximum profit firm i’s owners could obtain. We reported this point on the vertical
axis. The following section focuses on the effect of an increase in the tax rate on the size
of innovation, pollution, growth and profit in the downstream sector.
7 Aghion and Griffith (2005) assume B is sufficiently large that it can be ignored and write managers’
program as a minimization of γ : π = 0. Since there is no environmental regulation in their model they
obtain the simple solution κ
(χ−1)( χ
α
)
1
α−1
, which is identical across markets.
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Figure 1. Satisficing size of innovation before the tax increase (γND) and after (γND
′
).
3. Effect of a stricter environmental policy
Predicting the strong Porter hypothesis in our model requires finding that a stricter
environmental policy, that is, a higher τt, increases the size of innovation (∂γ
ND/∂τt > 0),
reduces pollution (∂Pt/∂τt < 0), enhances growth (yt− yt−1)/yt−1 > 0 and benefits firms.
This latter condition only needs to be verified in the downstream sector since profits in
intermediate firms are set equal to zero by satisficing managers. Proposition 1 below
states that our model verifies these conditions.
Proposition 1. If innovation is non-drastic (α−1 > χ), for κ < B sufficiently large, a
higher environmental tax rate:
(i) increases the size of innovation;
(ii) reduces pollution;
(iii) enhances growth;
(iv) increases downstream firm’s profit.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We focus on the impact of a higher tax rate on downstream profit by decomposing this
impact into direct and indirect effects.
From equation (3) a higher τt increases τtPt(i) for all i, which has a direct negative
effect on downstream profit. The downstream sector responds by reducing its demand for
intermediate inputs, which can be seen from equation (4). This shift in demand implies a
fall in output yt but also lower production costs in the downstream sector (
∫
px decreases
in equation (3)). It also reduces monopoly rents (χ − 1)xt of incumbent intermediate
firms whose profits become negative (equation (7)).
Satisficing managers respond by increasing the size of innovation just high enough to
avoid bankruptcy (πt(i) in equation (9) is set equal to zero). The dotted curve π
′ which
lies below π in Figure 1, represents profits after an increase in τt. The value for π
′ would
be negative at point γND; thus, the new size of innovation γND
′
is necessarily greater
than γND and slack decreases to B − γND
′
. Consequently, productivity At−1(i) increases
from γNDAt−1(i) to γ
ND′At−1(i) (equation (8)).
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This increase in productivity has a positive effect on output, which is reinforced through
the response of downstream demand in equation (5); x is indeed a positive function of A
in that equation. On the other hand, the higher size of innovation decreases aggregated
pollution Pt =
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)di ( ∂Pt∂τt =
κ
χ−1
∫
∂
∂τt
( 1γ )<0), although insufficiently to compensate for the
direct effect of a higher tax rate ( κ
χ−1
∫
1
γ
>0);8 i.e., τtPt increases in equation (3). Overall,
the positive effect on output compensates for the negative effect of the tax increase; we
have ∂yt
∂τt
= 1
α
κ
χ−1
∫
∂
∂τt
( τtγ )>0 and downstream profit increases,
∂pit(y)
∂τt
=( 1−αα )(
κ
χ−1)
∫
∂
∂τt
( τtγ )>0.
To check the robustness of Proposition 1, we considered several changes to the mo-
del’s assumptions and few extensions: drastic innovation, vertical integration, different
regulations and some opportunity cost in R&D when targeting cleaner innovations. We
also offer some discussion about how competition policy interferes with the win-win en-
vironmental policy.9
4. Extensions: how robust is the strong Porter hypothesis?
Making the opposite assumption that innovation is drastic (the direction of the inequality
α−1 > χ changes to α−1 < χ), the strong Porter hypothesis no longer holds in this model
(only parts i to iii of Proposition 1 are verified). As shown in Appendix B, we need
additional constraints on the parameter set to maintain incumbent prices pt(i) below
the marginal cost of the fringe, χ. Under these assumptions, part iv is not verified
because downstream profit, κ
α
∫ 1
0
At−1(i), although higher than that when innovation is
not drastic, no longer depends on τt. Any extra rent from further innovation following
the tax increase is fully appropriated by intermediate incumbents. And, none of this
extra rent is transferred to owners of intermediate firms in which satisficing managers
increase innovation just enough to maintain economic profit to zero. The lack of effect on
downstream profit is evidence of the weak Porter hypothesis. Noteworthily, this result is
also a consequence of the change in the behavior of managers who maximize the monopoly
rent with respect to x. Thus, complying with a more stringent environmental policy is
not profitable when innovation is drastic so that incumbent’s pricing is that of a pure
monopoly.
Considering vertically integrated firms provides another interesting insight regarding
the effect that market structure has on our results; see appendix C.1. Assume that in each
intermediate market i, the vertically integrated firm maximizes the sum of downstream
profit At(i)
1−αxt(i)
α − pt(i)xt(i) − τtPt(i) and intermediate incumbent’s rent (pt(i) −
1)xt(i); we consider the cost of production/innovation κAt−1(i) later when deriving the
satisficing size of innovation. We find that the size of the innovation is smaller than
that under vertical separation, which can be seen using the first part of Proposition 1
applied to the implicit function under vertical integration hV I(τt, γ). It can be shown
that hV I(τt, γ) > h(τt, γ) for all γ, where h(τt, γ) which we defined in Appendix A is the
implicit function under vertical separation. h(τt, γ
ND) = 0 from Proposition 1, which
implies that hV I(τt, γ
ND) > 0. But, h and hV I are increasing in γ. Consequently, γV I ,
which solves the implicit equation hV I(τt, γ) = 0 is less than γ
ND.
We also checked whether our results are valid for a different kind of regulation (Ap-
pendix C.2) and when intermediate firms pay the tax (Appendix C.3). In these cases,
8 Using the zero-profit condition (χ − 1)xt(i) − κAt−1(i) = 0 and equation (8), we obtain Pt(i) =
K
χ−1
1
γ(i) .
9 We thank the referees for having invited us to investigate these extensions. We address the case of
drastic innovation in section 4 and appendix B of the paper. Proofs regarding the other extensions are
available in on-line appendix C.
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the model is more tractable. First, considering a limit on the amount of pollution for
each input (Pt(i) ≤ P¯ ) leads to two solutions according to whether P¯ is greater or less
than some threshold µ ≡ (χ/α)
1
α−1 . When the constraint is binding (P = P¯ ), we find
solution γ¯ = κ
(χ−1)P¯
, which is constant across markets. Economic growth simply equals
γ¯ − 1 which is greater than 0 and increases with stricter regulation (P¯ decreases). Part
iv of Proposition 1 is also verified. These results are slightly different if we consider a
limit on the input-emission ratio (zt(i) ≤ z¯; see, e.g., Verdier (1995)): parts i, iii and iv
are verified, whereas pollution is not affected by regulation stringency (it is equal to µ).
Second, if we modify the model by assuming that the government levies a pollution tax on
intermediate goods producers, we again find that pollution is not affected by regulation.
Thus, we do not find the strong Porter hypothesis when intermediate firms pay the tax.
To summarize, regulating the input-emission ratio or taxing intermediate firms lead to
qualitatively similar results in the sense that all parts of Proposition 1 except the second
are true. Regulators should favor a limit on the amount of pollution as policy instrument.
We also examined the effect of assuming some opportunity cost in R&D when tar-
geting cleaner innovations: zt(i) ≡
1
At(i)β
, with β ∈ (0, 1) ( ∂z˜
∂A
A
z˜
=−β>−1). Proposition 1
holds (see Appendix C.4). It also holds if we consider that targeting more ambitious in-
novation implies an additional R&D cost cγAt−1(i) which we subtract from intermediate
profits (Appendix C.5).10 Another interesting extension relaxes the assumption that a
stricter environmental policy does not impact costs of the competitive fringe (Appendix
C.6). This assumption is consistent with another assumption of the model that marginal
production costs of incumbent intermediate firms are equal to unity and thus do not
depend on τt either. Instead, one may consider some differentiable function χ(τt) and
examine the direction of the effect of a change in τt. There are three cases: (a) χ
′ < 0,
(b) χ′ = 0, (c) χ′ > 0. Case b is that we have considered so far. In cases a and c, the
limit pricing strategy followed by incumbent intermediate firms is not affected because
pt(i) remains equal to χ(τt) regardless the form of our marginal cost function χ(·). In
case a the equilibrium value of x increases because the lower χ has a negative effect on
managers’ unit rent χ− 1 and on owners’ profit πt(i) thus leading managers to increase
innovation above γND. Case c can be interpreted by using symmetric reasoning.
One lesson we draw from these extensions is that the scope of the strong Porter
hypothesis is more sensitive to the choice of policy instrument available to the regulator
and market configuration than to changes in the specification of the cost functions and
the pollution equation.
We conclude this section with some discussion about whether competition policy could
interfere with the win-win environmental policy. Let us assume a decrease in the cost
of imitation χ, which can be interpreted as more potential competition (see Aghion and
Griffith, 2005, p. 38). We first show in Appendix C.7 that a decrease in χ has a positive
effect on innovation (∂γND/∂χ < 0). The main rationale for this is that a lower χ has
as direct negative effect on the market power of intermediate incumbent firms whose
satisficing managers respond by increasing the size of innovation just enough to avoid
bankruptcy. Regarding the combined effect of environmental policy and competition
policy on γND, it is positive (see Table C.1 in the on-line Appendix on page 22). Table
C.2 shows the different values for the pollution variable. A higher tax rate decreases
10 We could also add a debt repayment obligation to the model, dAt−1, as in Aghion and Griffith
(2005). This extension does not change the results. To see this just note that this extension amounts to
replace κ with κ+ d in equation (7).
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pollution whereas a lower χ increases it given τt. The impact of a stricter environmental
policy however is insufficient to offset the detrimental effect of introducing more potential
competition. Regarding the response of economic growth to a simultaneous change in τt
and χ, it is positive, as well as the response of downstream profit (Table C.3).
5. Concluding discussion
This paper extends the Aghion and Griffith’s (2005) model with satisficing managers to
allow for pollution and environmental taxation. Our theoretical results predict the strong
Porter hypothesis that a stricter environmental policy (a higher tax rate in our model)
improves growth, the environment, and induces profitable innovations. We checked for
robustness of our results to changes in several assumptions and made few extensions. The
strong Porter hypothesis holds under some changes in the model specification. However,
when innovation is drastic or when a competition policy is undertaken simultaneously
with environmental policy we do not find the strong Porter result. In the first case, we
find evidence of the weak Porter hypothesis because profit in the downstream sector no
longer depends on environmental policy. In the second case, pollution increases. The
intuition for this latter result follows from the effect of higher potential competition on
the use of inputs. A stricter environmental policy increases inputs quality too little to
compensate for the significantly higher use of those inputs. Pollution remains constant
in all other cases where Proposition 1 fails. In the following paragraphs we discuss other
possible extensions of the model in the direction of addressing whether the assumption
of profit maximizing firms is so crucial for the strong Porter hypothesis.
A first extension would be to introduce profit maximizing firms in the intermediate
sector. One approach would be to split that sector between a fraction m of inputs
produced by profit maximizing managers and the remaining inputs produced by satisficing
managers. In doing so one would obtain a one-to-one relationship between the number
of firms of a given type and the number of intermediate markets they own. A higher tax
rate might adversely affect profit maximizing firms in the short-term. Rebating the fiscal
revenue to these firms might solve the problem in the long-term. Instead of extending
our model to allow for profit maximizing firms, one could embed environmental policy in
the model of Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1999) who consider an economy in which
profit-maximizing firms and firms with satisficing managers – who minimize their effort
by delaying adoption of more efficient innovations – co-exist. The general equilibrium
analysis of their mixed economy, however, is questionable. Equilibrium growth rate in
their mixed economy is an ad hoc convex combination of growth rates of the two economies
(with profit maximizing managers or satisficing managers). Another approach would be
to divide the production of each intermediate input between the two types of firms and
make some assumption regarding how they compete with each other, as in Aghion, Harris,
Howitt, and Vickers (2001), and with the fringe.
A second extension would be to allow for a more realistic agency problem with classical
and non-profit maximizing firms. To preserve tractability of the model one could follow
Scharfstein (1988). Quality A in non-profit maximizing firms would be affected by the
realization of a non-observable random Bernoulli variable. Only managers would observe
intermediate output, innovation and the value of the random shock. Intermediate firms’
owners would require managers to satisfy a single profit target and condition managers’
payment on output.
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Appendix
A Non-drastic innovation
Proof of Proposition 1
(i). The size of innovation increases with the tax rate (∂γ
ND
∂τt
> 0).
Denoting 1
1−α
by e then equating (9) to zero leads to the following implicit equation
h(τt, γ) ≡ γ −
κ
χ− 1
α−e
(
χ+
τt
γAt−1(i)
)e
= 0. (A.1)
To prove part i we use the implicit function theorem at point (τt, γ
ND). First, we show
that a solution γND(τt, i) ≡ γ
ND exists and is unique in a market (note that it differs
across markets because of differences in At−1(i) ∀i ∈ [0, 1]). The function h is continuous
and increasing in γ; limγ↓0 h(τt, γ) = −∞ and h is bounded above by B as γ tends
to B with limγ↑B h(τt, γ) =B− κχ−1α−e
(
χ+
τt
BAt−1(i)
)e
<B−κ. We find that ∂h(τt, γ)/∂γ = 1 +
eτt/(χγAt−1(i) + τt) is greater than 1 and therefore invertible; thus, the direction of the
effect of an increase in τt on γ is given by the sign of −∂h(τt, γ)/∂τt = eγ/(χγAt−1(i) +
τt), which is positive. Consequently, γ increases as τt increases, which proves part i of
Proposition 1. Let denote the new solution by γND
′
as shown in Figure 1 on page 6). The
curve h (the algebraic counterpart of π in the figure) shifts to the right and has a lower
slope at the new solution. Combining these results, π lies below the 45◦ line, as shown
in Figure 1, and is concave. We remark that solutions γND of (A.1) is greater than 1.
Indeed, h(τt, 1) is one minus the product of three terms, each being greater than 1; thus,
h(τt, 1) is less than 0. But, h is increasing in γ. Consequently, γ
ND > 1 and so is γND
′
.
‖
(ii). Pollution decreases as the environmental tax rate increases (∂Pt
∂τt
< 0).
Using our definition for e, pollution in any intermediate market (see equation 6) can be
written as αe
(
χ+
τt
γAt−1(i)
)
−e
. Its derivative at point (τt, γ
ND) has the same sign as
−
∂
∂τt
(
τt
γND
)
= −
1
γND
(
1−
eτt
χγNDAt−1(i) + τt + eτt
)
< 0.
‖
(iii). The growth rate of the economy (yt− yt−1)/yt−1 ≡ g is positive; it increases with τt.
To ease the exposition we remove the exponent ‘ND’. From the zero-profit condition,
xt(i) =
K
χ−1
At−1(i) and xt−1(i) =
K
χ−1
At−1(i)
γ(i)
. Using these results and denoting Γ(i) ≡
γ−α(i)At−1(i) and s(i) ≡
Γ(i)∫
Γ(i)di
, we can show yt
yt−1
=
∫
s(i)γ(i)di, which is a convex
combination of the γ(i)’s. But, γ(i) > 1 (see the proof of part i of the Proposition).
Thus, yt
yt−1
, which is a convex combination of the γ(i)’s, all greater than 1, is greater than
1, which proves that g > 0. Using the Leibniz’s rule, gτt is equal to∫
s
(
αγ
∫
(γτt/γ)Γ∫
Γ
+ (1− α)γτt
)
di,
which is the integral of s times a convex combination of positive terms. It is positive,
thus proving the third part of Proposition 1. ‖
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(iv). A higher tax rate increases downstream firms’ profit (∂πt(y)/∂τt > 0).
Using equations (2), (4) and the assumption pt(i) = χ, downstream profit can be rewritten
as:
πt(y) =
∫ 1
0
(
1− α
α
)
(χ+ τt/At(i))xt(i)di. (A.2)
Replacing xt(i) with the right hand side of (5), using (8) as well as the implicit profit
equation, one obtains the following reduced downstream profit equation:
πt(y) =
(
1− α
α
)(
κ
χ− 1
)∫ 1
0
(
χ+
τt
γND(τt, i)At−1(i)
)
At−1(i)di. (A.3)
To prove part iv of Proposition 1, we differentiate equation (A.3) with respect to τt
at point (τt, γ
ND(τt, i)). But, ∂∂τt
(
τt
γND
)
> 0 as shown in part ii. Therefore, ∂pit(y)
∂τt
=(
1−α
α
) (
κ
χ−1
) ∫
∂
∂τt
(
τt
γND
)
is positive, which proves part iv of the proposition. ‖
B Drastic innovation
Assuming innovation is drastic changes the direction of the inequality α−1 > χ to α−1 <
χ. Remember that α−1 is the monopoly price intermediate firms would charge were
regulation absent (see footnote 6 on page 4). Under regulation, this price is higher
than α−1 to reflect the tax on pollution in the downstream sector. Assuming that in
its intermediate input market i incumbent maximizes (pt(i) − 1)xt(i) with respect to
xt(i), where the final sector’s inverse demand is given by equation (4), we obtain the
following quantity xDt (i) = α
2
1−α (1 + τt/At(i))
1
α−1At(i), where ‘D’ stands for drastic, and
corresponding monopoly price pDt (i) = α
−1 + α−1(1 − α)τt/At(i). We add two new
assumptions, which are α2 > 1/χ and τt < αAt−1(i) ∀i. These assumptions are sufficient
conditions for α−1 < pDt (i) < χ. The first assumption implies that of a drastic innovation
(α2 > 1/χ⇒ α−1 < χ). The second assumption sets an upper bound for the value of the
tax rate.
The size of innovation γD is determined by satisficing managers, γD : (pDt (i)−1)x
D
t (i)−
κAt−1(i) = 0 as in the case of non-drastic innovation with the difference that the economic
rent per unit of x, pD − 1 is endogenous. The implicit equation can be rewritten
γ − eκα−(1+α)e
(
1 +
τt
γAt−1(i)
)eα
= 0, (B.1)
where e was already defined. To prove that the size of innovation increases with τt, we
follow the same steps as in the proof of Appendix A. We rewrite the function at the left
hand side of (B.1) as hD(τt, γ). It is increasing in γ. Using the assumptions α
−1 < χ and
κ > χ − 1 in (B.1) we can show that γD > 1. Then we find ∂γD/∂τt= eαγ
D
γDAt−1(i)+τt+eατt
>0,
using the implicit function theorem. Regarding the effect of a more stringent policy on
pollution, note first that
PDt (i) = x
D
t (i)/A
D
t (i) = α
2e
(
1
1 + τt/γDAt−1(i)
)e
. (B.2)
Differentiating (B.2) with respect to τt leads to a decrease in pollution; the proof follows
that of the second part of Proposition 1 in Appendix A. The derivative of PDt (i) at point
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(τt, γ
D(τt)) has the same sign as
−
∂
∂τt
(
τt
γD
)
= −
1
γD
(
1−
eατt
γDAt−1(i) + τt + eατt
)
< 0.
The growth rate of the economy increases as τt increases when innovation is drastic. The
proof is simpler than that when innovation is non-drastic, for it is easier to see that the
ratio of outputs
yt
yt−1
=
∫ 1
0
At−1(i)di∫ 1
0
(γD(i))−1At−1(i)di
,
is greater than 1 and increases with τt. However, downstream profit, πt(y) =
κ
α
∫ 1
0
At−1(i),
does not depend on τt; thus, the downstream sector can not benefit from the positive effect
that environmental policy has on size of innovation. Considered together, these results
verify the weak Porter hypothesis, which we defined in the introduction of the paper.
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